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The Limits of Isomorphism: Global Investment Law
and the ASEAN Investment Regime
Sungjoon Cho* and Jürgen Kurtz**

Abstract
This Article probes the unique ontogenetic path of ASEAN’s regulation of foreign
investment by juxtaposing global investment law with the ASEAN investment regime. While
the former delivers a powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN exhibits in its strong
reflection of global investment norms, the latter sheds critical light on ideological and analytical
blind spots by exploring distinct heterogeneities in ASEAN’s investment regulation. Those
heterogeneities, especially preferences towards non-legal forms of cooperation and tailored
flexibilities to pursue public and development outcomes, are not simply outliers, but reflect
important historical and cultural values inherent to ASEAN and its members. The insights
uncovered in this Article invite scholars and policymakers to define a new form of global
investment law that is more inclusive and flexible than the strict and conventional paradigm.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Southeast Asia is rife with gloomy collective memories. Its colonial past was
followed by post-war geopolitical conflict and turbulence, including foreign
interventions in Vietnam and Laos, as well as military hostilities between
Indonesia and Malaysia. Ideological economic strategies designed to promote
welfare in the region in the wake of this turbulence, such as import substitution,
proved disappointing in their ability to deliver sustainable levels of economic
growth and development outcomes.1 Nonetheless, those states interlinked around
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) shifted their economic
paradigm from a closed to open economy in the 1980s.2 Ever since, trade and
investment flows in and out of this area have been nothing short of spectacular.
Between 1990 and 2014, the investment inflow to, and outflow from, this region
have increased approximately ten times and thirty-four times, respectively.3 By
2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to ASEAN exceeded inflows to
China, making it the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world.4
Notably, this paradigm shift from a closed to an open economy through
liberalization of trade and investment restrictions by ASEAN countries has been
powered by a thick set of global norms. A variety of treaties provided ASEAN
nations with modern regulatory platforms necessary to integrate their economies
into the global market. At the same time as the ASEAN nations were becoming
more involved in the global market, policymakers and private practitioners from
developed countries, as well as international organizations—such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—offered their technical
assistance to the ASEAN nations in adopting neoliberal reform in the areas of
trade and investment liberalization.5 Naturally, ASEAN nations relied heavily on
general legal principles and templates, such as model bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) originally created by developed states and then dispersed mimetically.

1

2

3

4
5

For exploration of the theory, adoption, and subsequent limits of import substitution as a
development strategy, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 486, 486–88 (3d ed. 2005).
See generally THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Shiro
Armstrong ed., 2011).
FDI
Statistics
Division
on
Investment
and
Enterprise,
UNCTAD,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx, 2 April 2016.
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report, at xv (2015), https://perma.cc/W7YR-KJTB.
On the imposition of structural adjustment conditions in the lending policies of international
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, see TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra
note 1, at 486–91.
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Nonetheless, isomorphism of this benchmarking type (mimetic
isomorphism)6 does not necessarily mean identical treaty products
(“equifinality”).7 Despite general convergence into global patterns in the basic
legal structure and tenets, both the individual ASEAN BITs (signed between
ASEAN nations and non-ASEAN nations) and the collective ASEAN investment
regime (AIR) (addressing intra-ASEAN investment flows) feature unique
departures from the global investment model. There is a temptation to dismiss
these departures as mere outliers. This Article, however, takes those
heterogeneities seriously and explores a structural explanation by juxtaposing
world polity theory and historical institutionalism. While the former delivers a
powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN BITs and AIR demonstrate in
their manifestations toward Global Investment Law (GIL), the latter tends to
complement the former by shedding critical light on the ideological and analytical
blind spots exposed by those heterogeneities.
Against this background, Section II begins by defining GIL as an extensive
and thick network of BITs, investment chapters of certain regional trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA)
Chapter 11, and investment arbitration decisions derived from these primary
sources. GIL is a relatively congruent legal regime whose original development
has been nurtured by key developed countries, such as the U.S. and the E.U.
member-states, since the 1980s. Those BITs and investment chapters comprising
GIL are substantively similar, largely because of: (a) asymmetry of negotiating
power with smaller states forced to act as law-takers; and (b) the automatic
tendency—until recently—to replicate those terms throughout the network. In
explaining both the emergence and prevalence of GIL, we employ world polity
theory. According to this theory, GIL as a world investment culture holds a
homogenizing effect over the AIR. Section III contrasts this converging force of
GIL with key diverging trends within AIR. Certain tailoring of AIR is
substantively and conceptually distinct to GIL, sometimes in problematic ways.
From a comparative perspective, we highlight the uniqueness of AIR vis-à-vis
GIL, including the striking asymmetry between extra-ASEAN and intra-ASEAN
investment liberalization (“reverse open regionalism”) as well as departures from
a body of GIL classically represented by Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Here, we can

6

7

See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983).
MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 138–39 (Peter J.
Katzenstein ed., 1996).
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benefit from “historical institutionalism” in tracing ASEAN’s unique pathdependency, such as in its own vaunted “ASEAN Way.”8
The insights uncovered in this Article hold broader implications beyond
ASEAN. World polity or world culture is real, and its homogenizing power is
undeniable. A vast network of transnational norm entrepreneurs—both public
and private—offers recipients of such culture concrete manuals in the form of
treaties and other regulations. In this regard, the “norm lifecycle” model—norm
emergence, norm cascade, and internalization—is useful in grappling with this
homogenizing process and its implications.9 Yet, despite its strong gravitational
pull, world culture’s converging power should be placed into careful perspective.
A number of factors, such as subject matter, may lead receivers of world culture
to emulate the global script selectively rather than indiscriminately.10 In this sense,
globalization may be “the two-fold process involving the universalization of
particularism and the particularization of universalism.”11 We should caution
against the “inevitability assumption”12 that underlies world polity theory. One
may want to ask “what is happening in ASEAN regarding international economic
governance?” rather than “how is ASEAN’s investment liberalization going?”13
As Daniel Lynch aptly observes, “rather than . . . viewing states as either already
socialized or certainly on the way to becoming socialized into the [global]
constitutive norms . . . it is significantly more satisfying to view states as choosing
to embrace some norms while rejecting others fundamentally.”14 Indeed, the push
to selectivity is given added momentum when one considers that global norms

13

The “ASEAN Way” is a sovereignty-preserving, non-interference principle formed through the
unique post-war experiences of ASEAN nations. The ASEAN Way has shaped not only geopolitical
but also economic policies in the ASEAN region. Vinod K. Aggarwal & Jonathan T. Chow, The
Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-Regime Undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation, 17
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 262 (2010); Gillian Goh, The ‘ASEAN’ Way: Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s
Role in Conflict Management, 3 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 113 (2003); Lee Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of
Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order (Nuffield C. Pol. Grp., Working Paper, 2009).
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG.
887, 895 (1998).
Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeniety-Heterogeneity, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES
41 (Mike Featherstone et al. eds., 1995).
ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 102 (Mike
Featherstone ed., 1992).
Daniel C. Lynch, International "Decentering" and Democratization: The Case of Thailand, 48 INT. STUD. Q.
339, 341 (2004).
See Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 17–18 (2002).

14

Lynch, supra note 12, at 345.

8

9

10

11

12
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(such as GIL) are not in complete coherence within themselves.15 This yields
contradictory claims and interpretations of the global norms by some states.16
The limits of functionalism—or rationalism—embedded in historical
institutionalism teaches us that inter-state haggling may not be the only pathway
to international cooperation. The values inherent in historical and cultural
contexts are incalculable and, therefore, not prone to simple reciprocal bargaining.
International negotiators should take these contexts of their counterparts into
careful account before advancing market-opening requests and seek to negotiate
sustainable international commitments through communication and dialogue.
Indeed, a certain institutional heterogeneity departing from the world polity may
subsequently become a global trend itself. Some observers have been struck by
the prescience of the ASEAN states because of the way in which they remodeled
the ASEAN investment treaty in light of the Asian financial crisis. We are only
now seeing other states belatedly inserting flexibilities for financial restrictions,
such as capital controls, particularly in the E.U., as they had been overly influenced
by the orthodox position prosecuted aggressively under the neoliberal mantra.
Ironic as it may sound, some local deviations from world culture may become
internationalized.17

II. G LOBAL I NVESTME NT L AW AND THE ASEAN I NVESTMENT
R EGIME
A. Conceptualizing Global Investment Law
By interpreting various aspects of international relations, such as interstate
cooperation, through global norms and value and meaning structure, world polity
theory provides the theoretical underpinning of GIL. World polity theory is a
macro-structural theory in that it emphasizes the broad “cultural” background that
shapes states’ identities and actions. Furthermore, as an institutionalist theory, it
shares its sociological tradition with Emile Durkheim (“collective
representation”)18 and Pierre Bourdieu (“field”).19 John Meyer and the Stanford
school developed this theory in an effort to understand the phenomenon of postwar globalization.20 In particular, the theory was developed in order to understand

15
16
17
18
19
20

FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 137–138.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 136.
EMILE DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 22 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915).
See Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, 7 SOC. THEORY 14, 14–16 (1989).
See generally John Boli et al., World Society, World-Polity Theory and International Relations, in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert A. Denmark ed., 2010).
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normative and institutional convergence and isomorphism.21 Meyer et al.
epitomize world polity theory as follows:
The development and impact of global sociocultural structuration greatly
intensified with the creation of a central world organizational frame at the end
of World War II. In place of the League of Nations, which was a limited
international security organization, the United Nations system and related
bodies (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) established expanded agendas of concern for
international society, including economic development, individual rights, and
medical, scientific, and educational development. This framework of global
organization and legitimation greatly facilitated the creation and assembly of
expansive components of an active and influential world society.22

At the heart of world polity theory lies the thesis of inevitability and
convergence. Bjorn Wittrock argues that “modernity is a global condition that
now affects all our actions, interpretations, and habits, across nations and
irrespective of which civilizational roots we may have or lay claim to.”23 Likewise,
Martha Finnemore observes that “Weberian rationality is marching relentlessly
across the earth, leaving in its wake a marketized, bureaucratized world of
increasingly similar forms.”24 Therefore, as a symbol of modernization, world
culture is naturalized and thus normativized as if this process was inevitable.25 This
inevitability thesis understands economic development in terms of cultural
isomorphism,26 in contrast to a “world-systems theory” that focuses on
stratification, such as core versus periphery, from a materialist perspective.27
The inevitability and convergence thesis underlying world polity theory tends
to determine its investigative methodologies. For example, if an unknown society
was discovered, world polity theorists would analyze its economy “with standard
types of data, organizations, and policies for domestic and international

21

Connie McNeely, World Polity Theory, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA
GLOBALIZATION 2316, 2316–17 (George Ritzer ed., 2012).

22

John Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 163 (1997) (citation omitted).
Bjorn Wittrock, Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition,
129 DAEDALUS 31, 59 (2000).
FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 138.

23

24
25
26
27

OF

Lynch, supra note 12, at 341.
McNeely, supra note 21, at 2319.
“World-systems theory” views the world as a system comprised of core and periphery states
organized in accordance with global divisions of labor based on states’ political and economic
power. CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION: STRUCTURES OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY 203–06 (1989); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM III 129–30
(1974).
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transactions.”28 In this sense, world polity theory shares a rationalist tradition that
measures regularities in political life by a scientific or positivist methodology.29
Against this theoretical background, GIL can be defined as a thick set of
Western-initiated BITs and investment chapters in regional trade agreements,
such as NAFTA, as well as related case law. Although traceable to customary
international law as originally developed in the nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries, most of its contemporary corpus juris was formulated in the late 1980s
following the tide of globalization. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, customary international law reflected the strategic interests of major
state powers. In particular, takings of private property by the state were regarded
as a deviant act that could only take place in exceptional circumstances. Even
when authorized, expropriation would require the payment of full compensation
to the affected property owner. Fundamental liberal precepts like these came
under serious challenge by the mid-twentieth century, however.
The wave of decolonialization after the end of the Second World War
drastically transformed such liberal precepts through escalating practices of
expropriation and nationalization of foreign assets.30 Newly decolonized countries
pursued not only political independence, but also economic sovereignty. While
continuing investment from the former colonizers may have contributed to
economic development of those newly independent countries, the ASEAN
nations politically shunned Western investment as a lingering legacy of
colonialism. Instead, these newly independent states sought to indigenize their
economies by acquiring full control of the infrastructural frameworks left by the
former colonizers.31 In a time of fierce political contestation, an array of
ideological influences spanning from Marxism to import substitution fueled these
inward-looking investment policies.32
It was not until the 1980s that the winds of change began to influence those
developing countries that had long adhered to inward-looking development
strategies. The disappointing outcome of their preferred models stood in striking
contrast with the glaring economic performance by some Asian countries that had
chosen an outward-looking (often export-driven), orientation. Once the
developing countries resolved, or were forced through IMF-imposed lending
28

Meyer, supra note 22, at 145.

29

See Shu-Yun Ma, Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical
Institutionalism, 28 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 57, 61–62 (2007).

30

THOMAS BREWER & STEPHEN YOUNG, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 52–54 (1998).

31

For targeted examples, see LOUIS WELLS & RAFIQ AHMED, MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT SAFE:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 38 (2007).

32

TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at 486–88.
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conditions, to change gears in their development models, these former colonies
had to send a strong signal to capital-exporting countries and their nationals that
they were now ready to welcome foreign investment with due protection. For this
purpose, the pro-investor terms of BITs were an ideal choice for these capitalimporting states as it enabled them to communicate their commitment to the strict
economic transitions of the post-Cold War period.
Not surprisingly, the primary focus of these new investment treaties was the
contentious practice of government takings of property owned by foreign actors.33
Even if a state was acting for a public purpose—which would encompass newer
goals of nationalization34 in a non-discriminatory fashion—the treaties now
dictated that a government seizing a foreign national’s property had to
compensate the foreign property holder at a very particular rate.35 The post-war
authorities that had begun to tentatively affirm a loose customary standard of
“appropriate” compensation were now displaced in favor of the fuller
requirement of “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation.36 This guarantee
of compensation was also extended beyond the paradigmatic case of direct
expropriation to encompass regulatory or tax measures that might be considered
indirect public takings.37 Yet there was no attempt in early BITs to delineate the
level of disruption or impact on a foreign investor sufficient to trigger the
obligation to pay compensation for “indirect” expropriation. This absolute
guarantee is typically matched by other broad standards of protection required of
a signatory host state within early BITs. The most abstract of these is the
obligation to accord foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment”38 with no real
attempt across early BIT practice to define the outer contours of this amorphous

33

See BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 52–61.

34

Am. Int’l Grp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 December 1983, 4 Iran–U.S. C.T.R. 96, 109–10 (1983III); Amoco Int’l. Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 July 1987, 15 C.T.R. 189, 233 (1987II).
For example, Article III of the Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty provides:
Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or
nationalization . . . except for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner;
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in
accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment
provided for in Article II(3).
UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 198 (vol. 3, 1996). This
type of provision is by no means limited to investment treaties concluded by the U.S. It is instead
a feature of most post-war investment treaty regimes.

35

37

Id.
Id.

38

UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 209–33 (vol. 1, 1996).

36
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standard. At best, certain formulations—especially in treaties concluded by the
U.S.—eventually link its coverage to treatment at customary international law.39
Notably, there was no real attempt to delineate these strong treaty
obligations with core regulatory objectives. On this point, there was a striking
departure with the post-Second World War attempts to facilitate the reduction of
barriers to trade in goods in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
1947, which sought to accommodate key public values. Domestic taxes and
regulations are fully permitted under the national treatment obligation provided
that they are not protectionist devices that would distort the bargain on tariff
reductions among GATT member states.40 Yet other articles within the GATT
facilitated intervention by states when required to maintain domestic stability. 41
There is even a list of general exceptions that enable states to prioritize key public
values, such as health protection, over their commitments to liberalize trade.42 In
the classic BIT model, there is no equivalent of the flexibility for state action
inherent in GATT Article XX to balance against the strict obligations formed
during this inception period.
The unique dispute settlement processes under BITs offer an especially stark
insight into this project of carving out a strong zone of protection for foreign
investors. These processes provide the greatest normative departure from the preexisting customary regime. The customary rules on diplomatic protection of aliens
controlled when a state could bring international action for harm to its nationals,
including economic actors operating abroad. The right to exercise diplomatic
protection is vested exclusively in the state of the injured national and remains a
39

40

For example, Article 1105(1) of NAFTA provides: “Each Party shall accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.” North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105(1),
Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 17 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (emphasis added).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(1), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶¶ 14–15, WTO
Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996); Appellate Body Report, European Communities–
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, ¶¶ 97–100, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R
(adopted Mar. 12, 2001).

41

For an account suggesting that the American emphasis on domestic stability in the GATT
negotiations was a projection of New Deal policies on domestic regulatory intervention, see AnneMarie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law and the Projection of the New Deal
Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL
FORM 131–33 (John Gerrard Ruggie ed., 1993). For a reflection of this thesis in the GATT treaty
text consider two particular clauses. GATT Article XII authorizes the use of quantitative restrictions
to safeguard domestic balance of payments when payment difficulties had resulted from policies to
secure full employment. GATT Article XIX authorizes emergency action to reintroduce tariff
protection where a domestic producer (and by extension its employees) is threatened with serious
injury from import competition. GATT, supra note 40, at arts. XII, XIX.

42

GATT, supra note 40, at art. XX.
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discretionary power that the state is under no duty or obligation to exercise. 43
Aside from the sovereign election to champion the cause of the injured national,
custom required the exhaustion of local remedies as a further prerequisite to the
exercise of diplomatic protection.44 The rationale here was to ensure that “the
State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its
own means, within the framework of its own domestic system.”45 Both of these
customary practices were eroded after a slow period of maturation of the
investment treaty movement, which culminated in the new dispute settlement
processes of BITs. Early generation BITs maintained the classic public
international law default of state-to-state mechanisms as the sole means of
resolving disputes in this field.46 The first BIT (between Italy and Chad) to break
from this mold and include a radical new form of dispute settlement—investorstate arbitration—did not enter into force until 1969.47 Moreover, only by 1974
could a clear trend for the inclusion of investor-state arbitration in investment
treaties be discerned.48
Under these newer structures, foreign investors as private claimants are
given standing to bring action in international fora for breaches of treaty
obligations by host signatory states, and there is no requirement for them to first
resort to or exhaust domestic legal processes as a condition of such action.49 This
dramatic elevation of private commercial interests is finessed through the idea of
arbitration “without privity.”50 State signatories to investment treaties offer their
consent, in advance, to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to hear disputes
between investors and host states. Jurisdiction is ultimately crystallized when a
foreign investor elects to commence a claim for breach by a signatory state. This
structure is a conceptually distinct and far more expansive use of arbitration that
43

As stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “[t]he State must be viewed as the sole judge
to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease.
It retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.” Barcelona Traction
Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep.
44, ¶ 79 (Feb. 5).

44

The exhaustion of local remedies was recognized by the ICJ as “a well-established rule of customary
international law” in the Interhandel Case. Interhandel (Switzerland v. U.S.), Preliminary
Objections, 1959 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 27 (Mar. 21).
Id. at ¶ 27.

45

49

RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 122, 122–29 (1995).
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 45 (2009).
Jason Web Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment and the Rule of (International) Law:
Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. SOC. REV. 805, 815 (2008).
Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 233 (1995).

50

Id.

46
47

48
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extends the scope of arbitration beyond its traditional role of resolving discrete
disputes in negotiated contracts between commercial parties. The standing
consent offered in most investment treaties is usually to a range of systems of
dispute settlement at international law.51 The most prominent of these is the
World Bank-based International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), an arbitral institution that specializes in international
investment disputes. ICSID was formed in 1966, in the eye of the storm of
expropriatory behavior in the developing world.52 It offers a self-contained
mechanism to settle disputes between foreign investors and their host states. If a
state extends its consent to ICSID, under a treaty, its right to espouse diplomatic
protection is specifically excluded.53
The aforementioned body of international investment law, manifested in a
dense network of over 3,000 bilateral and regional investment treaties,54
constitutes GIL. By the 1990s, GIL, empowered by the triumphant zeitgeist of
neoliberalism (the “End of History”),55 claimed its place as a global model of
economic governance. Developing countries subscribed to this model in droves
as they elected to attract foreign investment based on free market policies.56 The
number of newly-signed BITs, as well as the number of investment disputes,
subsequently skyrocketed. While there were only 385 BITs signed from 1959 to
1989, a staggering 1,857 BITs were concluded from 1990 to 1999.57 Indeed, as
José Alvarez has observed, “[t]he 1990s . . . were the era when the modern
investment regime was born.”58 Capital-exporting countries, such as the U.S. and
E.U. member-states, spread their model BITs to numerous capital-importing
countries, explaining the isomorphic nature of most BITs signed in that period.
Moreover, some of these model BITs began to be incorporated into investment
chapters of certain regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, which adopted
conventional investor-state arbitration mechanisms such as the ICSID rules. In
sum, the dense network of BITs, investment chapters of regional trade

51

52

These include UNCITRAL rules or arbitration under the processes of the International Chamber
of Commerce. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 46, at 129–30.
BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 72.

53

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 27, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.

54

UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, 1 IIA ISSUES NOTE 2 (2015).
See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).

55
56

Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
373, 382 (1998).

57

UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999, at 1 (2000).
José Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 617 (M. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).

58
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agreements, and derivative arbitral jurisprudence from these treaties collectively
form GIL.
Figure 1: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Cases (1987-2014)59

B. ASEAN’s Adoption of Global Investment Law
As discussed above, GIL is an economic version of world culture that
transnational actors, both state and non-state, share and advocate as a “policy
script”60 to guide and control behavior. A dense transnational network—
comprised of government officials, private practitioners (who often have inherent
incentives to champion strong investment protections), international
organizations (the IMF and the World Bank), think tanks, and academic
institutions—“translates” the neoliberal Washington Consensus on foreign
investment into the operational language of legislation and enforcement.61 These
“norm entrepreneurs,” often equipped with expertise and organizational
apparatus, play an important role in the norm cycle of GIL as they help GIL
spread and cascade so that norms are eventually internalized into the domestic

59
60

61

See UNCTAD, supra note 54.
Sarah Sunn Bush, International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures, 65 INT’L ORG.
103, 108 (2011).
Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447, 456 (2006); John
Boli & George Thomas, INGOs and the Organization of World Culture, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD
CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 71 (John Boli &
George Thomas eds., 1999).

352

Vol. 17 No. 2

The Limits of Isomorphism

Cho and Kurtz

legal systems of the ASEAN economies.62 Indeed, ASEAN members’ widespread
use of BITs in the 1980s and 1990s with developed countries appear to have
motivated such “norm cascade” through “a combination of pressure for
conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state
leaders to enhance their self-esteem.”63 In particular, as “enactors” and “carriers”
of world investment norms,64 international organizations—such as the IMF,
World Bank and APEC—strongly advocated trade and investment liberalization
during the same period. These organizations often “lobby and harangue states to
act on [global investment] principles.”65 In sum, this norm cycle, especially the
process of norm cascade and internalization, may explain the isomorphism
identifiable in substantive investment norms of ASEAN BITs and the subsequent
AIR.66
While recognizing possible local deviations, world polity theorists still
exhibit a firm belief on eventual convergence into the global model of economic
development.67 Under world polity theory, AIR is ASEAN’s voluntary adoption
of GIL through its socialization (learning and emulation) with “rationalized
others,”68 such as developed countries and international organizations, regarding
world investment culture. ASEAN members are “embedded” in transnational
investment networks and therefore socialized to “want” GIL.69 World polity
theory does not view such adoption as being forced by a hegemonic power, as
world system theory is inclined to do. World polity theorists would argue that GIL
provided ASEAN economies with a world investment model that is a highly
rationalized, and thus universalized, form of economic governance, and that
ASEAN members legitimate themselves in joining this world investment culture. 70
Any local, particularistic divergence from this world investment model, such as
exclusion of certain sectors from investment liberalization, would in turn suffer a
legitimacy deficit.71
In an apparent penetration of GIL into the ASEAN community, BITs
signed by ASEAN members proliferated in the 1990s, with countries such as Laos
(with France in 1989), Vietnam (with Italy in 1990), Cambodia (with Malaysia in
62

Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 9, at 896–98.

63

Id. at 895.
Boli & Thomas, supra note 61, at 34, 73.

64
65
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Id. at 46.
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 9, at 905.
Meyer, supra note 22, at 146.
Boli & Thomas, supra note 61, at 14–17.
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FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 2.
Meyer, supra note 22, at 148.
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Id.
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1994), Brunei (with Germany in 1998), and Myanmar (with the Philippines in
1998).72 Those BITs concluded by ASEAN members in the 1990s demonstrate a
high degree of conformity with model BITs promoted by major capital-exporting
countries (such as the U.S.). Thus, BITs concluded in the 1990s featured common
core elements, such as national treatment obligations; most-favored-nation
principle; broad protection of fair and equitable treatment; compensation for
direct and indirect expropriation; and investor-state dispute resolution.
Yet in the heyday of ASEAN BITs (mostly concluded between ASEAN and
non-ASEAN countries), ASEAN members also initiated the formation of a
collective intra-ASEAN investment regime (AIR). The BITs that concerned extraASEAN investment flows played a decisive role in constructing the AIR.
Consequently, much of the treaty language in the AIR can be traced to the BIT
movement. The first version of the AIR, the “1987 ASEAN Agreement for
Promotion and Protection of Investments,”73 transplanted many of the major
obligations for investor protection found in BITs, such as adequate compensation
for direct or indirect expropriation,74 fair and equitable treatment,75 the right of
foreign investors to repatriate their capital and earnings (regardless of impact on
the financial system of the receiving state),76 and an investor-state arbitration
mechanism whose decision is binding as a matter of treaty obligation.77
The AIR that emerged from the 1987 Agreement subsequently evolved into
the “1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.”78 With an
ambitious goal of establishing “a competitive ASEAN Investment Area,” 79 the
1998 Framework Agreement shifted its strategic focus from investor protection,
which was emphasized in the 1987 Agreement to the liberalization of intraASEAN investment flow. In the wake of the 1998 Framework Agreement,
ASEAN members sought “a more liberal and transparent investment
environment” in order to “substantially increase the flow of investments from both

72

73

74
75
76
77

Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 820–21 (2006).
Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987 [hereinafter 1987 ASEAN Agreement].
Id. at art. VI.
Id. at arts. III(2), IV(2).
Id. at art. VII.
Id. at arts. X(2), (5).

78

Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, Oct. 7, 1998 [hereinafter 1998
Framework Agreement].

79

Id. at art. 3(a).
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ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”80 The level of ambition under the 1998
Framework Agreement was evidenced by determined commitments, such as
national treatment being extended to ASEAN investors by 2010, and to all
investors by 2020, and all industries being opened for investment to ASEAN
investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020.81
The AIR has culminated in the “2009 Comprehensive Investment
Agreement” (ACIA).82 In this latest iteration, the focus shifted from liberalization
to a more expansive objective of “integration” between ASEAN states. The ACIA
preamble envisions a “more integrated and interdependent future”83 with
“economic integration” to be achieved, inter alia, through “joint promotion of the
region as an integrated investment area.”84 In the same line, with special
recognition of least developed members, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam, development took center stage within AIR, leaving its explicit mark in a
set of objectives85 and guiding principles.86 The level of ambition among the
member states when it comes to key objectives (such as investment liberalization)
has continued to escalate. Under ACIA, ASEAN members would develop a
“comprehensive investment agreement” that is “comparable to international best
practices.”87 The aspiration to meet “international best practices” naturally
benchmarks the long-standing praxis created by the main lawmakers in the field
being developed by countries, such as the U.S., and international organizations,
such as the WTO.

III. T HE L I MITS OF G LO BAL I NVESTMENT L AW ’ S
H OMOGENIZ ING E FFECTS IN THE ASEAN I NVESTMENT
R EGIME
A. The Limits of Global Investment Law
Despite the AIR’s patterns of convergence into GIL, it appears puzzling that
one can still witness a number of aberrations in the AIR vis-à-vis GIL. While some
deviations are not uncommon in any local implementation of a powerful external
benchmark, on close observation, those in AIR are not so much inconsequential
80

Id. at art. 3(a)(i) (emphasis added).

81

Id. at art. 4.
2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009 [hereinafter ACIA].

82
83
84

Id. at recital 2.
Id. at art. 1(d).

85

Id. at art. 1 (including the strategic goal of using the investment agreement to achieve the “end goal
of economic integration”).

86

Id. at art. 2(f) (recognizing the need to grant “special and differential treatment and other flexibilities
to Member States depending on their level of development”).

87

Id. at recital 1.
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anomalies as structural heterogeneities that may qualify the general thesis
underpinning aspects of world polity theory. These conspicuous heterogeneities
from GIL can be witnessed in both individual ASEAN BITs and the subsequent
collective investment project of the AIR.
Most ASEAN BITs fully preserve the right of the signatory host state to
regulate the question of admission of foreign investment. The myriad of strong
BIT protections thus only apply on a post-establishment basis, after foreign
investment has been admitted into the host state. At its most extreme, this
structure entitles a state to exclude entire economic sectors from participation by
foreign investors, which may well be necessary if those sectors had been targeted
for protected cultivation as part of an infant industry strategy. Even if a state
chooses to open a given economic sector to foreign competition, they are free to
impose conditions upon the entry of a foreign investor. In this respect, most Asian
BITs are conceptually different from a stronger liberalization model that
characterizes the investment treaty practice of a number of developed countries,
especially the U.S. and Canada. Those states typically require combined national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment at the pre-admission stage, thus
severely restricting discretionary regulatory mechanisms that prohibit entry, or
offer it only on conditions that reduce the overall value of the investment to the
investor.88
Relatedly, many Asian BITs delineate the operation of substantive
investment treaty protections (even on a post-admission basis) by reference to
compliance by the foreign investor with some element of domestic law. At the
outset, however, it is important to note that there is heterogeneity on this key
point across the entire field of Asian investment treaty practice.89 Thailand, for
instance, tends to sit at the most conservative end of a spectrum, as evidenced by
Article 3(1) of the 1978 Thailand–U.K. BIT, which provides: “The benefits of this
Agreement shall apply only in cases where the investment of capital by the
nationals and companies of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party has been specifically approved in writing by the competent authority of the
latter Contracting Party.”90
88

On what the authors call a “full liberalization model,” see Ignacio Gomez-Palacio & Peter
Muchlinski, Admission and Establishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 242–43 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).

89

Dato’ Cecil Abraham, State Approval in South East Asian Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION: LESSONS FOR ASIA 123–33 (Michael Moser ed., 2008).
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Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion of the Investment of
Capital and for the Protection of Investments, Nov. 28, 1978, at Art. 3(1) (emphasis added). For a
more recent example of this strategy in Thai BIT practice, see Kingdom of Thailand and the Federal
Republic of Germany, Jun. 24, 2002, at art. 2(2).
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The formula under Article 3(1) requires foreign investors to prove that they
have met very specific and formalized preconditions to entry, not least of which
is approval in writing by the host state. Unless foreign investors can do so, their
investments will not be protected under the BIT. Approval—which will often be
tied to registration under domestic law—is often a technique used by states to
supervise the grant of benefits to attract foreign investment in key economic
sectors (including through investment incentives),91 and to monitor specific
conditions imposed on foreign investors to maximize the development benefits
to the host state from foreign investment in those sectors (through employment
of performance requirements such as local content conditions).92
This type of stringent precondition—requiring a discrete and affirmative
action on the part of the host state to guarantee coverage of investment
protection—is also a characteristic of Indonesian and Malaysian BIT practice. For
example, Article 9 of the 1970 Belgium–Indonesia BIT provides the following:
[t]he protections afforded to investors by the provisions of the present
Agreement shall apply . . . in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia only
to investments which have been approved by the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia pursuant to stipulations contained in the Foreign
Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or other relevant laws and regulations of the
Republic of Indonesia.93

Likewise, under the 1981 Malaysia–U.K. BIT: “The said term [investment]
shall refer . . . in respect of investments in the territory of Malaysia, to all
investments made in projects classified by the appropriate Ministry of Malaysia in
accordance with its legislation and administrative practice as an ‘approved
project.’”94 There have been very few disputes initiated under the individual BITs
of ASEAN members where a tribunal has proceeded to examine the merits of a
91

For an explanation by Malaysia of its rationale in using this technique, see Philippe Gruslin v.
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, ¶ 17.1 (Nov. 27, 2000).

92

For the use of local content conditions by Indonesia when regulating foreign investment in the
automotive sector (which were ruled contrary to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures), see Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS54/R, Jul. 2, 1998. See also Canada: Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act, BISD 30S/140, adopted on Feb. 17, 1984 (ruling that the Canadian practice
of enforcing certain undertakings given by foreign investors in order to gain discrete regulatory
approval to invest in Canada breached the obligation of national treatment in GATT Article III(4)).
Agreement Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Indonesia on the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 9, Jan. 15, 1970. For a more recent
example of this strategy in Indonesian BIT practice, see Agreement Between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, art. III(1)(a), entered into force Jul. 29, 1993.

93

94

Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
1(b)(ii), May 21, 1981.
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claim. The obvious reason for this, as we have seen, is that many of those BITs
provide ASEAN states with the extensive ability to plead non-compliance with
domestic law as a basis for limiting jurisdiction of the BIT.
The 1987 Agreement, which was the first version of AIR, continued this
inward-looking, sovereigntist trend, despite its goal of facilitating greater
investment flows within the ASEAN community. Most of all, the 1987 Agreement
effectively restricted treaty protection for foreign investors by subjecting those
protected investments to formal government approval with possible conditions
imposed by the host government.95 Concomitantly, this strict threshold for
investor protection prevented foreign investors from seeking remedies from the
investor-state arbitration mechanism under the 1987 Agreement. In Yaung Chi Oo
Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Myanmar, the tribunal refused to hear the investor's claim on the
grounds that the investor failed to prove that the investment in question had been
formally approved when the 1987 Agreement took effect.96 Other arbitral
tribunals outside of the ASEAN context have criticized such formalities as they
“advance no real interest of either signatory State” and “constitute an artificial trap
depriving investors of the very protection the BIT was intended to provide.”97
Indeed, the Yaung Chi Oo tribunal itself admitted that “[t]he 1987 Agreement was
thus subject to important limitations in terms of its coverage, as compared with
other bilateral and multilateral investment protection treaties.”98
The more advanced 1998 Framework Agreement also revealed a seriously
limited dimension when compared to the typical orientation in GIL, despite its
expansive mandate to “substantially increase the flow of investments into ASEAN
from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”99 In contrast to the detailed roadmap
on liberalization of restrictions on flows of foreign investment (at least within
ASEAN), the 1998 Framework Agreement makes no direct reference to the usual
investment protection mechanisms found in most BITs, such as guarantees of fair
and equitable treatment; full protection and security; and compensation in the
event of direct or indirect expropriation.100 On first view, this would seem to raise
the paradoxical possibility that the ASEAN members are providing lower
standards of investment protection amongst themselves compared to what is
offered (via BITs) to foreign investors from non-ASEAN states. Yet on closer
examination, the framers seem to have adopted a scaffolding strategy that would
95
96

Id. at art. II(1).
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v. Myanmar, 42 I.L.M. 540, at ¶¶ 60–62 (2003).

97

Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 106
(Feb. 6, 2008).

98
99

Yaung Chi Oo, supra note 96, at ¶ 23.
1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 3 (emphasis added).

100

Id.
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see the new liberalization guarantees (in the 1998 Framework Agreement) apply
concurrently with the largely protective standards (in the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement):
Member States affirm their existing rights and obligations under the 1987
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and
its 1996 Protocol. In the event that this Agreement provides for better or
enhanced provisions over the said Agreement and its Protocol, then such
provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.101

There are a number of problems with this general strategy, as well as with
the particular framing of this clause. The strategy is certainly an opportunity lost
for the ASEAN members. Many of the unqualified standards in the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement reflect the high-water mark of investment protection as articulated in
BITs, and thus GIL, entered into throughout the 1980s. By the mid to late 1990s
(especially within NAFTA), a number of states had begun to calibrate those
standards more carefully in an attempt to better balance investment protection
with core components of regulatory autonomy. Of course, the new 1998
Framework Agreement contains a range of very extensive exceptions that are
designed to supply precisely such a recalibrated balance among the ASEAN
members. Yet one can easily imagine a scenario whereby there is legal lacuna in
how the two instruments relate to each other. For instance, the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement provides for a largely unqualified obligation among member states to
allow for free transfer of capital102 and also provides for investor-state dispute
resolution.103 Yet the 1998 Framework Agreement inserts a range of exceptions
that would enable an ASEAN member to impose capital restrictions. In a
hypothetical dispute surrounding the imposition of capital controls, the question
arises whether the ASEAN member can invoke the later exceptions to justify any
prima facie breach of the earlier obligations. The framing of the loose conflict
component in the formula above seems to suggest that the provisions of the 1998
Framework Agreement will prevail if they provide for “better or enhanced
provisions.”104 Yet, this only begs the question of what evaluative criteria should
be employed to identify whether the later 1998 Framework Agreement meets this
standard. From a strict investor protection viewpoint, the earlier 1987 Agreement
obviously provides a higher, and thus presumably “better,” standard.105 But one
101

Id. at art. 12(1).

102

1987 ASEAN Agreement, supra note 73, at art. VII (Repatriation of Capital and Earnings).
Id. at art. X.

103
104
105

1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 3.
This seems to be the position taken by the Yaung Chi Oo Tribunal: “[A]rticle 12(1) [of the 1998
Framework Agreement is] not [to] be interpreted as applying de novo the provisions of the 1987
ASEAN Agreement, including Article X, to ASEAN Investors. It simply makes it clear that in
relation to any investment which is covered by both Agreements, the investor is entitled to the
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might also argue that the increased detail of the 1998 Agreement (especially on
exceptions) necessarily constitutes “enhanced provisions” (and relatedly, to the
extent they represent the new sovereign choice among ASEAN member states to
recalibrate investment treaty exposure, also represent a “better” standard).
Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions of the 1998 Framework
Agreement are marked by a further pullback from earlier investment protection
standards. Specifically, the ASEAN members have confined dispute settlement to
state-to-state procedures, revoking entirely the standing of foreign investors as
private claimants to initiate investor-state arbitration (which continues to operate
only under the 1987 ASEAN Agreement). The wisdom of this choice is
questionable. The new treaty is characterized by both limited scope of operation
(in that it only extends to FDI) and a broad range of flexibilities (in the form of
exemptions from investment treaty strictures for compelling state purposes). With
this in mind, the likely concerns of unmeritorious instigation of investor-state
arbitration, as well as the possibility of expansive pro-investor readings, seem to
be countered (at least partly) by these treaty innovations. The costs of omission
of investor-state arbitration are very real and significant. Affected foreign
investors from a given ASEAN state are now left to the mercy of the discretion
of their home governments to espouse their claim in the state-to-state forum. This
significant gap in legal protection is vividly illustrated by the Yaung Chi Oo dispute,
where the Singaporean investor in Myanmar was denied protection under the 1987
ASEAN Agreement (for failure to show that Myanmar had “specifically
approved” its investment for the purposes of that treaty), and, although falling
within the scope of the later 1998 Framework Agreement, had no standing to
commence a claim under that treaty.106 In cases such as this—where the amount
of invested capital is relatively small and the economic actor does not have political
traction within the home state—the prospect of espousal under state-to-state
dispute settlement process is remote at best. This weak intra-ASEAN investor
protection is increasingly costly to ASEAN members and tends to necessarily
impede further economic integration. In particular, considering the more liberal
extra-ASEAN investment treaties, this asymmetry deters ASEAN members from
fully taking advantage of synergies between intra- and extra- ASEAN investment
treaties, tracking the inherent limitations of the “hub and spoke” model in regional
trade agreements.107

benefit of both and thus of the most beneficial treatment afforded by either.” Yaung Chi Oo, supra
note 96, at ¶ 82.
106
107

Id.
In the regional trade agreement setting, a hub (developed country) can get free access to multiple
spokes (developing countries), while spokes do not usually offer the same access between each
other unless they form a “rim” among themselves. Frank Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the
FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 539, 557–58 (1995).
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Interestingly, the ACIA, as the most recent version of AIR, also exhibits
asymmetry between intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment treatment, yet
in a diametrically opposite fashion. Now the ambitious liberalization package
would apply only to intra-ASEAN investment, abandoning a dual goal of
facilitating both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment flows under the
1998 Framework Agreement. Even the effective scope of intra-ASEAN
investment has diminished in comparison with the 1998 Framework Agreement.
While the 1998 Framework Agreement required ASEAN members to “open
immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN investors,”108 ACIA only
provides a positive list of liberalized areas, such as manufacturing, agriculture,
fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying, and services incidental to manufacturing,
agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining, and quarrying.109
The AIR’s approach to the investor-state arbitration mechanism
demonstrates a salient departure from GIL, including the NAFTA Chapter 11 and
its arbitral jurisprudence. The arbitral jurisprudence—especially in cases brought
against ASEAN member states—is not the only external influence that has shaped
the contours of the ACIA. The expressed desire to develop an investment
initiative “comparable to international best practices”110 has also led the ASEAN
negotiators to draw on a range of external treaty practices. While NAFTA Chapter
11 is an obvious comparator,111 the ASEAN negotiators have also drawn on
subsequent changes to the investment treaty practices of the U.S. and Canada
made in light of their experiences as respondents to cases brought under NAFTA
Chapter 11. Yet the modeling from that experience is by no means one of simple
and crude transplant, as is occasionally evident in the practice of some states in
the international community. The evidence shows that the negotiators have been
reasonably careful in sifting through those lessons and adapting them to the
specific context of the ASEAN grouping.
For instance, NAFTA Chapter 11 excludes subsidies and government
procurement from the obligation to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
foreign investment vis-à-vis domestic counterparts.112 The ACIA does the same,
but goes one step further. It excludes subsidies and grants from all of the
disciplines of the treaty.113 This seemingly small distinction is especially significant
in the ASEAN context. Under NAFTA Chapter 11, subsidies could still be subject
to investor-state complaints as breaching the separate obligation of fair and
108

1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 7(1)(a) (emphasis added).

109

Id. at art. 3(3).
ACIA, supra note 82, at rec. 2.
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NAFTA, supra note 39.
Id. at art. 1108(7).
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ACIA, supra note 82, at art. 3(4)(b).
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equitable treatment, and that discipline, for a select group of arbitral tribunals, has
been understood to include a particular constraint against discrimination. 114
Certain forms of subsidies are, by definition, discriminatory in that they are only
extended to domestic actors and if that reading of fair and equitable treatment
were to be applied by a hypothetical tribunal, it would preclude their use entirely
in key settings. That litigation risk, however, is foreclosed in the ASEAN context,
which is particularly important given the complex economic and political issues
associated with the use of subsidies. Alan Sykes, for instance, has cast doubt from
an economic perspective on whether many legal systems (including but not limited
to the WTO) can differentiate socially constructive subsidies from those that are
economically problematic.115
There is also evidence of a clear feedback loop between key investor-state
arbitral cases and particular negotiation choices made in the ACIA. When it comes
to the obligation to accord most-favored-nation treatment, a distinct set of arbitral
tribunals have ruled that that obligation can be used by a foreign claimant to
import dispute settlement mechanisms from another treaty entered into by the
respondent host state. In that way, claimants have been able to avoid
preconditions to the commencement of investor-state arbitration in the primary
treaty, such as a mandatory period of litigation in the domestic courts of the host
state. In the first ruling of this jurisprudential line, the Maffezini v. The Kingdom of
Spain Tribunal relied on a comparative methodology (drawing on different
formulations within the universe of BITs) to justify its broad interpretation of the
most-favored-nation obligation, pointing out that where States Parties have
decided to confine the obligation to substantive rather than procedural
differences, they have done so explicitly in a given clause.116 The ACIA negotiators
in turn have provided future tribunals with precisely that sort of explicit direction
in footnote four, which provides that “[f]or greater certainty . . . this Article shall
not apply to investor-State dispute settlement procedures that are available in
other agreements to which Member States are party.”117
The 2009 ACIA also now includes obligations of fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security which had been omitted in the 1998 Framework

114

The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 135–36 (Jun. 26, 2003).
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Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 473, 473, 501 (2010).
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Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 51–54
(Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). For an analysis of the justifications used by the Tribunal
to support its expansive reading, see Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An
Uneasy Fit?, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 861, 877–79 (2004).
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ACIA, supra note 82, at art. 6, note 4(a).
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Agreement.118 The fair and equitable standard has been a primary driver of state
dissatisfaction with the expanding investor-state arbitral jurisprudence, as it has
been applied broadly with tribunals often adopting strained interpretative
methodologies. Here there is a qualitative break with the preferred strategies of
key NAFTA members in responding to the growing arbitral jurisprudence on fair
and equitable treatment. The U.S., for instance, has elected to constrain the zone
of discretion of arbitral adjudicators by explicitly linking fair and equitable
treatment obligations to the minimum standard of protection for aliens under
customary international law.119 Yet, if the goal of this treaty recalibration is not
only to confine protection but also to deliver certainty in adjudication, then the
wisdom of this method is questionable given the notorious difficulty of locating
customary international law. For example, the requirements of opinio juris are
famously difficult to pin down.120 Instead, the ASEAN framers have elected to
restrict the fair and equitable standard to the one clear dimension that is
commonly accepted as part of its customary scope: the obligation not to deny
justice to foreigners in legal and administrative proceedings.121

B. Contextualizing Global Investment Law within ASEAN
While world polity theory is useful in explaining AIR’s general patterns of
institutional development—especially its isomorphic relationship with GIL—
world polity theory still cannot fully grasp AIR’s unique historical specificity
characterized by “legacies of founding moments in shaping long-term power
relations” and the “prevalence of incremental reform over stasis and fundamental
transformations.”122 Indeed, those general patterns, such as the expansion of
investment liberalization, are often interrupted by unpredictable, and even
inefficient, developments.123
Admittedly, even world polity theorists do not envision perfect adoption of
world culture by states. They are prepared to concede particular incoherence
118
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Id. at art. 11(1).
U.S. 2004 Model BIT, arts. 5(1) and (2), in CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE, &
MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 397
(2007).
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See, for example, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, at 231–353 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib., Jun. 8, 2009).
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ACIA, supra note 82, at art. 11(2)(a).
Orfeo Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, 65 INT’L ORG. 367, 369 (2011).
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between dominant world culture and local variations (“decoupling”). Indeed, any
wholesale importation of world culture into diverse local conditions appears
infeasible,124 especially as the highly idealized nature of world culture would
inevitably conflict with various local contexts.125 To that extent, they appear to
acknowledge that isomorphism does not necessarily mean “equifinality.”126
Nonetheless, from a highly rationalist—or functionalist—perspective, world
polity theorists tend to equate local variations with local resistance to world culture.
They believe that states, “as a matter of identity,” have already committed
themselves to “such self-evident goals as socioeconomic development.”127
AIR members certainly obtain their collective identities from GIL, as GIL
constitutes those members’ actions (policies) regarding international investment
liberalization and regulation.128 In a Durkheimian sense, those actions collectively
“represent” GIL. At the same time, however, social actors do not mechanically
follow global scripts; they may “select” from, and even “modify,” them.129 Thus,
their identities are also constituted by domestic values. For instance, this is the
case with the claim to particularity inherent in the vaunted “ASEAN Way.”130 As
Laurence Whitehead observes, “[N]ational historical memories may filter the
interpretation of transmissions from abroad.”131 Likewise, Daniel Lynch contends
that “states differ dramatically on the question of whether to submit to complete
reconstitution by yielding to global socialization and allowing international symbol
markets to shape domestic collective identity.”132 In this setting, the level of AIR
members’ socialization with contemporary peers, or the titular “rationalized
others,” cannot but be limited. In particular, to tackle unique local—not global—
problems, “different and shifting” solutions will be tried.133
Against this background, historical institutionalism can brighten analytical
blind spots left by world polity theory. Historical institutionalists capture subtlety
and complexity in historical development of international organizations under the
124
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notion of “path dependency.” According to Fioretos, path dependency is “a
process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often
a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative
institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would
be more efficient according to a standard expected utility model.”134 Likewise,
Pierson and Skocpol define path dependency as a situational context in which
“outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the
recurrence of a particular pattern into the future.”135 The concept of path
dependency is instrumental in deciphering sociocultural codes shared by ASEAN
members that tenaciously affect AIR’s institutional development despite a strong
pro-market headwind from GIL.136 As Roland Robertson trenchantly observes,
economic internationalization does not lead to the demise of “nationally
constituted society.”137
Importantly, initial historical conditions do not determine outcomes per se;
rather, they are “stochastically” related.138 That set of initial conditions generates
“its own law of inertia” that will decrease the compliance cost yet dramatically
increase the cost of departure therefrom.139 Economists often refer to this
phenomenon as “increasing returns.”140 The notion of increasing returns, and
therefore path dependency, tends to gain unique persuasive traction given various
characteristics of political life, such as its collective, intersubjective nature, the lack
of exit options, its self-reinforcing nature, and the prevalence of interpretive
heuristics.141
Historical institutionalism may offer the following explanation regarding the
tenacious legacy effects of sovereigntism even in AIR’s most recent development
stage (ACIA). The strong, inward-looking cultural norm, as represented by the
ASEAN Way, shaped the founding moments of ASEAN. The ASEAN Way can
be defined as “traditions of consultation and consensus-building and, in particular,
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the norm of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,”142 or as a “metaregime of non-interference, sovereignty, incrementalism, informality and
consensual decision-making.”143 This grand principle that became the bedrock of
ASEAN originated from the resolution of a fierce regional conflict between
Indonesia and Malaysia over disputed territory in Borneo from 1963 to 1966,
which is coined Konfrontasi.144 ASEAN countries had to suspend regional
confrontation among one another to collectively respond to radical communism
at home and abroad and focus on economic development.145 The ASEAN Way is
often expounded as a reason for the lack of any major military conflicts since
ASEAN’s inception as a regional organization.146
Yet political non-interference can easily translate into “protectionism” in an
economic sense.147 Once such an overarching norm is firmly established, power
elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and domestic interest groups (including
domestic producers of main products) in ASEAN economies configured their
strategic position on the basis of this inward-looking orientation. This initial
position also generates increasing returns, or positive externalities, through
coordination and networking for those particular groups.148 As long as these
vested interests benefit from the initial arrangement, those beneficiaries have no
reason to change the status quo. Admittedly, protectionism is ubiquitous especially
in periods of economic decline, yet in general is destined to be defeated by
increasing market openness in most economies. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s unique
path dependency defined by colonial experience and intra-ASEAN power struggle
placed its priority products (such as agro-based and wood-based products) in a
strategically important position. Thus, ASEAN economies remain “intransigently
protectionist,” despite potential benefits from an integrated internal market and
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economies of scale therefrom.149 This path dependency may explain a puzzling
asymmetry between intra-ASEAN trade flows and extra-ASEAN flows regarding
those priority products.150 In these two product sectors, ASEAN trade statistics
demonstrate a strong extra-ASEAN export bias.151 In other words, ASEAN
members producing those products elected to target global markets instead of
ASEAN markets in the face of strong protectionism at the regional level.
Likewise, a certain critical juncture, such as the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis,
may have led ASEAN members to further entrench the early sovereigntist culture
(such as the ASEAN Way), while other non-ASEAN countries may have
embraced the same event as an opportunity for transformation.152 Table 1 exhibits
the strong extent to which ASEAN members prioritized global markets over intraASEAN economic opportunities.
Table 1: Total Imports, Exports, and Intra-ASEAN Exports, by Priority
Sectors, 2004–2008 (WITS)153
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Thousand
Intra-ASEAN
exports
Agro-based
1,360,040
933,008 1,144,436 1,687,945 2,788,211
products
Automotives
3,283,824 4,191,755 4,690,222 6,416,477 7,987,317
Electronics
47,876,167 52,268,178 56,110,336 57,982,542 56,928,581
Healthcare
869,375
987,092 1,235,436 1,685,250 2,000,350
Textiles and
1,932,309 1,912,064 2,122,545 2,420,349 2,431,291
apparel
Wood-based
1,143,053 1,230,734 1,237,746 1,394,430 1,424,370
products
ASEAN
exports to rest
of world
Agro-based
12,103,978 12,486,983 14,057,296 19,313,273 28,435,800
products
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Automotives
Electronics
Healthcare
Textiles and
apparel
Wood-based
products
ASEAN
imports from
rest of world
Agro-based
products
Automotives
Electronics
Healthcare
Textiles and
apparel
Wood-based
products

11,893,715 15,714,044 18,579,336 25,174,340 27,124,044
215,482,996 239,608,257 265,615,439 266,126,413 267,278,788
3,506,738 5,692,372 8,071,235 10,049,727 10,167,219
28,252,081 29,279,163 33,140,705 36,301,953 38,527,881
14,874,195 16,074,553 17,000,980 18,327,184 17,661,561

2,858,852

3,280,498

3,798,554

5,090,003

6,695,704

20,993,758 22,482,370 21,549,767 26,486,024 33,332,207
112,712,493 115,987,928 135,143,296 140,732,507 146,680,531
5,299,171 6,456,913 7,290,542 8,359,650 9,339,715
13,597,104 14,690,394 16,692,532 21,385,662 22,541,775
865,724

989,336

1,255,923

1,615,914

1,543,718

Furthermore, AIR’s institutional transformations appear more sporadic than
linear, as world polity or rational choice theorists may envision. Such non-linearity
in institutional evolution may be accounted for by a phenomenon coined
“institutional layering.”154 The framers of ASEAN and AIR, as sovereigntists,
were largely reluctant to transfer their regulatory power over investment to AIR.
Instead, they preferred adding new regulatory layers to existing institutional
arrangements (treaties). Thus, one can witness incremental institutional
arrangements in regulating foreign investment, rather than a full-blown
liberalization through ceding regulatory power to AIR.
ASEAN’s sovereigntist path has led AIR to deviate from “historical
efficiency”155 (full-blown investment liberalization) that might have resulted from
GIL as part of world culture. Given that divergence from world investment
culture, AIR can be said to demonstrate “decentering” that protects core local
values from GIL’s homogenizing power.156 In the same vein, the closer, and
therefore the more directly, GIL affects core local culture, such as sovereignty, the
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more likely GIL engenders resistance from the receiving entity (AIR).157 Perhaps,
the very content of GIL is incoherent and contingent, considering fierce
competition among powerful actors who desire to advance their own standards as
GIL.158 The “dialectical and internally contradictory character”159 of GIL may
provide AIR members with ample justifications for their occasional departure
from the core values of GIL.

IV. C ONCLUSION
This Article has probed the unique ontogenetical path of AIR from two
opposing perspectives. From the first perspective—reflecting world polity
theory—AIR has demonstrably emulated GIL ever since ASEAN members fully
subscribed to neoliberal reform, such as investment liberalization, in the 1980s.
Saddled with the overpowering trends of globalization, ASEAN members made
an ambitious paradigm shift toward free and open investment in their
development strategy. From the second perspective, however, a number of nontrivial exemptions from GIL that AIR saliently exhibits raise into question any
unreserved transplant of this world investment culture. Here, ASEAN members’
socio-cultural background, epitomized by the ASEAN Way, tends to expound
these selective divergences. Historical institutionalism frames this second
perspective and illustrates ASEAN nations’ distinct path-dependency under AIR.
To overcome a seemingly irreconcilable tension between GIL’s prescription
of pro-market economic governance and AIR’s apparent departure therefrom,
one should embrace the fact that the “globality” itself transcends the global
economy, although the former may still include the latter.160 Applied to the specific
context of ASEAN, rather than viewing AIR as a mere outlier from a conventional
normative model, scholars of international law and politics should acknowledge
the necessity of defining a new form of GIL that is more inclusive and flexible
than the conventional paradigm. Reimagining GIL in this edifying manner holds
open the promise of offering policymakers and negotiators innovative conceptual
tools with which to reconstruct a more effective and legitimate set of international
norms for investment liberalization and protection.
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